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17.1 Overview
As in many other modern regulatory states, environmental regulation in the United 
Kingdom (UK) is complex, and reflects a mixture of international, regional, and national 
obligations and has achieved a level of maturity with multi-layered governance systems and 
diverse regulatory approaches. The problem of complexity in environmental law is certainly 
not unique to the UK and the challenge of defining and analysing environmental law outside 
of any jurisdictional context has been noted.1 There are, however, grounds for arguing that 
the complexity of UK environmental regulation goes beyond these conceptual challenges. 
In 2012, the United Kingdom Environmental Law Association (UKELA) criticized the state 
of environmental law in the UK as being overly complex, incoherent, and lacking in integration 
and transparency.2 In doing so it identified multiple factors that suggested that the UK’s 
approach to designing, making, and implementing environmental law created extra and 
unnecessary levels of complexity—to such an extent that it was difficult for those involved 
in environmental regulation to understand and interpret the law.
These criticisms provide some context for the pre-emptive defence that this chapter does not 
attempt to provide a comprehensive mapping of the conceptual contours of  environmental 
law in the UK. Accordingly, the first section of this chapter considers the allocation of power 
for environmental regulation in the UK. It does so by considering three competing forces 
that have helped to shape the ‘infrastructure’ of environmental law in the UK. The second 
section provides an outline of the structure and substance of the core areas of environmental 
regulation in the UK. The aim here is to summarize the techniques employed in the UK to 
regulate environmental quality, land use, waste management, nature conservation, and 
industrial pollution control. The final section addresses implementation.
17.2 Allocation of Powers
This section considers three significant forces that have helped to shape UK environmental law. 
The first is historical; the second highlights the impact of external influences; the third force 
highlights two key internal factors, namely the evolving nature of the UK’s Constitution and the 
emergence of new forms of ‘environmental rights’ and the constrained fragmentation of envir-
onmental law and infrastructure across the individual countries of a devolved United Kingdom.
17.2.1 The Forces of History
The first of these forces is historical, with the Victorian roots of environmental law 
 influencing certain areas of modern environmental law, the institutional framework, and 
1 E. Fisher et al, ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law Scholarship’ 
(2009) 21 Journal of Environmental Llaw 213.
2 UKELA, ‘The State of UK Environmental Legislation in 2011–2012’, available at: http://www.ukela.org.
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elements of national regulatory style. Analysing how and why environmental laws 
emerged in the UK provides clues to the origins of identity, what we might term the ‘DNA’ 
of modern-day regulation.
From early times there were rudimentary local controls over small-scale pollution.3 
These controls supplemented the private law rights in nuisance that addressed neighbourly 
conflicts arising from the typically dirty, noisy, smelly existence of those living in Mediaeval 
England.4 Throughout the early years of the nineteenth century, however, the intensive and 
uncontrolled industrialization and urbanization of English cities caused pollution on a 
much wider scale. In the face of escalating public health problems and widespread environ-
mental degradation, the courts were asked to apply principles previously used to balance 
competing interests in neighbouring land to the much broader and extensive impacts of the 
industrial revolution.
The effectiveness of this judicial response has been the subject of debate.5 Whilst  nuisance 
law may have protected private property rights, the courts were unable to provide a con-
sistent, coherent, and comprehensive response to the negative externalities of polluting 
industries. Accordingly, the state sought to fill the gap.6 Although the scale of statutory 
intervention was significant, the substantive scope of individual statutes was narrow with 
little consideration given to the need for wider, more integrated solutions. These initiatives 
were not triggered by overarching environmental policy objectives but by a reactive, ‘quick 
fix’ pragmatism. This often led to the displacement of consequences of pollution.7 The out-
come was reactive and piecemeal legislation which although functional and effective in the 
context of the specific problems that were being addressed, were also inflexible and lacked 
substantive coherence.
This lack of substantive coherence was also reflected in structural arrangements. As dif-
ferent issues arose, more detailed layers of legislation and policy were added, resulting in a 
largely unplanned but complex environmental infrastructure. Thus, whilst the UK had rela-
tively early pollution control regimes that had remarkably long lifespans, the effect was to 
produce a ‘fragmented accretion of common law, statutes, agencies, procedures and policies’.8
The long history of environmental controls in the UK has also had an impact on modern 
regulatory style. The early pollution control schemes relied heavily upon technocratic, 
closed, administrative processes implemented through high levels of discretion in stark 
3 L. Etherington, ‘Canons of Environmental Law: Pollution of Churches and the Regulation of the 
Medieval “Environment” ’ (2016) 36 Legal Studies 566.
4 See E. Cockayne, Hubbub: Filth, Noise & Stench in England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
5 See J. Brenner, ‘Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution’ (1974) 3 Journal of Legal Studies 403; 
J. P. S. McLaren, ‘Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution: Some Lessons from Social History’ (1983) 
3 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 155; and B.  Pontin, ‘Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution: 
A Reinterpretation of Doctrine and Institutional Competence’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 1010.
6 Notable examples include the Public Health Acts 1848 and 1875, the Alkali Acts 1863, 1874, and 1881, 
the Sanitary Act 1866, and the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876.
7 See M. Lobban, ‘Tort Law, Regulation and River Pollution: the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act and 
its implementation’ in J.  Steele and T.  T.  Arvind (ed.), Tort Law and the Legislature (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2012).
8 N. Carter and P. Lowe, ‘The Establishment of a Cross-Sector Environment Agency’ in T. Gray (ed.), 
UK Environmental Policy in the 1990s (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), 40.
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contrast to more modern participative processes backed by strict environmental quality 
standards and extensive judicial enforcement.9
17.2.2 External Forces—The Impact of the European Union
The effects of the legacy of the historical development of environmental law in the UK are 
subtle and embedded when compared to the direct impacts of membership of the European 
Union (EU). Most current environmental law and policy in the UK has been introduced to 
implement the requirements of European law.10 The scale of the task of approximating 
European law has had a direct impact upon both the complexity of domestic law and the 
manner in which environmental law has been created in the UK. Many detailed European 
provisions are transposed directly into secondary legislation. This ‘mirror image’ approach 
has resulted in the large growth of secondary legislation in environmental law in the UK 
and is reflected in the substance of law.
When transposing the requirements of Directives, two relatively simplistic approaches 
have been taken to avoid problems of non-conformity. The first approach has been to repli-
cate the wording of the relevant Directive without any further attempt to identify the best 
way of assimilating European law into domestic legislation (so-called ‘copy out’).11 The sec-
ond approach has been to draft domestic legislation in very broad terms, but with direct 
and specific references to the detailed obligations found in the relevant Directive.12 These 
approaches ensure that no more and no less than the requirements of European law are effect-
ively transposed but also mean that any lack of clarity or uncertainty within the  original 
Directives are transmitted into national law.
Membership of the EU has brought other profound changes in environmental govern-
ance, regulatory style, and in the UK courts. The system of monitoring and enforcement of 
European obligations via the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) has proven to be an effective tool.13 European regulatory style has 
also provided the impetus for changing and/or the reshaping of traditional approaches to 
encompass regulatory innovation and a marked shift away from a pragmatic, flexible decen-
tralized approach to a ‘new formalism’.14 Finally, the influence of European environmental 
law on the UK courts has also been transformative with the CJEU promoting a broader, 
more purposive approach to interpreting environmental legislation.
9 Lobban, ‘Tort Law, Regulation and River Pollution’.
10 In considering the impact of leaving the EU in 2017, it was estimated that there were over 1,100 dif-
ferent pieces of European derived legislation that related to policy areas under the control of the UK 
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. The House of Lords European Union Committee, 
Brexit: Environment and Climate Change 12th Report of Session 2016–17, HL Paper 109, 10.
11 e.g. the schedules of development subject to environmental impact assessment in the Town and 
Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011.
12 e.g. the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2016.
13 In evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee it was suggested that fear of infraction at a 
European level was a more significant driver for legislative and policy change then decisions in the 
domestic courts, see The House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: Environment and Climate 
Change, para. 70.
14 R.  MacRory, ‘Shifting Discretions and the New Formalism’ in O.  Lomas (ed.), Frontiers of 
Environmental Law (Chichester: Wiley Publishing 1991).
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17.2.3 Internal Forces—The (Weak) Constitutional Basis  
for UK Environmental Law
In the absence of a codified constitution, the UK has no basis for entrenched and legally 
enforceable substantive environmental values or norms which could shape national 
 environmental infrastructure through clearly identifiable rights. But it would be wrong to 
think that constitutional forces play no role in allocating power for environmental regula-
tion. Such power can be found in statutes and other sources of law and policy. For example, 
constitutionally significant statutes such as the European Communities Act 1972 and the 
Human Rights Act 1998 have given effect to the supremacy of European law and certain 
human rights principles. In addition, it is possible to identify other sources of law that 
have created procedural, derivative,15 and what might be termed substantive rights which 
collectively form a weak constitutional basis for environmental rights. For example,  procedural 
rights of public participation found in the Aarhus Convention and European legislation have 
been transposed into national legislation and been given legal effect through the courts.16 
Derivative environmental rights emerging from the ‘greening’ of human rights at the 
European level also have a weak constitutional role in the UK.17
Substantive environmental rights are much more difficult to identify, subject to two pos-
sible exceptions.18 First, the integration of environmental principles—in particular duties 
connected to the principle of sustainable development—can be seen in diffuse forms, creat-
ing a patchwork of duties, objectives, and aims with these principles in mind.19 Six key 
environmental principles are also incorporated into general national law and policy through 
the EU Treaty and individual Directives.20 The challenge of translating such general 
 principles into substantive legal rights in the national context is problematic. Whilst the 
national courts have, on occasion, interpreted certain Directives in a manner consistent 
15 Such rights are strictly derivative because ‘the duty is not one of protecting the environment, but 
one of protecting humans from significantly harmful environmental impacts’, see A.  Boyle, ‘Human 
Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment’ (2008) 18(3) Fordham Environmental Law Review 471. 
For use of such rights in the environmental context see Lopez Ostra v Spain (1994) 20 EHRR 277; Guerra 
v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 357, and Tatar v Romania (2009) 21(3) Journal of Environmental Law 506; and 
more generally, I. Cenevska, ‘A Thundering Silence: Environmental Rights in the Dialogue between the 
EU Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2016) 28 Journal of Environmental Law 301.
16 M. Lee and C. Abbott, ‘The Usual Suspects? Public Participation under the Aarhus Convention’ 
(2003) 66 Modern Law Review 80.
17 Margin of appreciation means that it is difficult to establish derivative environmental rights under 
Art. 8 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (the right to a private life); see Powell and Rayner 
v United Kingdom (1990) 12 European Human Rights Reports 355; Hatton v United Kingdom (2002) 34 
EHRR 1; (2003) 37 EHRR 28.
18 Perhaps mirroring the reluctance to develop such rights at the European level, see Cenevska, ‘A 
Thundering Silence’, at 320.
19 A. Ross, ‘Why Legislate for Sustainable Development? An Examination of Sustainable Development 
Provisions in UK and Scottish Statutes’ (2008) 20 Journal of Environmental Law 35.
20 Sustainable development is referred to in Art. 3 Treaty on European Union (TEU) and five other 
principles (i.e. relating to polluter-pays, precaution, prevention, integration, and rectification at source 
are found in Art. 191(2) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
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with those principles,21 the general view has been that such principles have no legal force 
but should be considered as policy objectives.22
The second method of embedding enforceable rights is through the creation of suffi-
ciently clear and certain environmental targets in primary legislation. It has been argued 
that the Climate Change Act 2008 sets sufficiently clear targets for greenhouse gas (GHG) 
reduction to create a form of substantive rights in the UK’s political constitution.23
17.2.4 Internal Forces—Constitutional Complexity  
in a Devolved UK
Whilst the weak basis for constitutional rights across the UK as a whole resides mostly in 
drawing inferences from various sources of law, there is a much more obvious and direct 
influence of the allocation of power across the individual countries of the United Kingdom. 
The ongoing process of devolution in the UK has shifted responsibility for large portions of 
environmental law and policy away from the UK Parliament in Westminster to national 
executives in three of the four constituent countries.24 This has set the scene for possible 
diversification and distinctiveness, although the overarching need to meet international 
and European obligations means that there are substantive limits to the variation.
The term ‘UK environmental law’ has always been somewhat misleading. Certainly, there 
has never been a single body of environmental protection laws that apply across the UK. 
But then again, the idea of a formal federal system of government would also not capture 
the complex constitutional framework for environmental law in the UK. Historically, the 
existence of separate and distinct legal systems in Scotland and Northern Ireland was 
reflected in slight differences in the development of relevant private law tools and statutory 
provisions.25 Until formal devolution of environmental law-making powers in 1998,26 the 
differences in statutory frameworks were, however, largely structural, or in the case of 
Northern Ireland, notable mostly for delays and inadequate implementation of the require-
ments of European law.27 The fragmentation of environmental law-making has, however, 
accelerated post-devolution with separate law-making powers extended to all the constituent 
countries in the UK. This picture of non-uniformity in environmental laws is underscored 
by the fact that although the devolution of powers in the UK was comprehensive, the exact 
nature of law-making powers varies in each country.
21 See Downs v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2009] Environmental Law 
Reports 19.
22 R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Duddridge [1995] Environmental Law Reports 151.
23 A.  McHarg, ‘Climate Change Constitutionalism? Lessons from the United Kingdom (2011) 2 
Climate Law 469.
24 i.e. Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales.
25 e.g. the law of nuisance in Scots law does not distinguish between private and public nuisance, and 
is somewhat narrower in scope than in England and Wales see, G.  Cameron, ‘Scots and English 
Nuisance . . . Much the Same Thing?’ (2008–9) 9(1) Edinburgh Law Review 98–121.
26 Under the Scotland Act 1998, Government of Wales Act 1998, and the Northern Ireland Act 1998.
27 K. Morrow and S. Turner, ‘The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same? Environmental 
Law, Policy and Funding in Northern Ireland’ (1998) 10(1) Journal of Environmental Law 41.
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Scotland has extensive powers to pass primary legislation on environmental matters, 
subject to certain areas ‘reserved’ for consideration by the UK Parliament.28 In some cases, 
these powers have been used to implement EU and international obligations and therefore 
closely resemble aspects of legislation elsewhere in the UK,29 but there have been significant 
examples where Scotland have sought to take the lead in going further than ‘minimum 
compliance’30 or through the use of innovative, integrative regimes31 or unilateral setting of 
stretching environmental goals.32
Northern Ireland has similar powers to make primary environmental legislation,33 but 
the instability of the political context has had a limiting effect on both the development of 
coherent environmental governance mechanisms and related laws. For example, the break-
down of the power-sharing agreement agreed as a precursor to devolution34 and subsequent 
suspension of the Northern Irish National Assembly meant that little or no progress was 
made on implementing a separate body of environmental statutes from 2002 until 2007. 
Following a fresh agreement on power sharing, devolved powers in relation to  environmental 
law have been utilized more regularly.35 Notwithstanding increased legislative activity, 
particularly in the context of compliance with EU obligations, a combination of factors have 
contributed to serious criticisms of the state of environmental regulation and governance in 
Northern Ireland.36 These factors, when combined with the political fragility of power, have 
meant that progress has been patchy at best and in many ways Northern Ireland is arguably 
is still some way behind the rest of the UK.37
Progress in Wales has taken a yet again different route post devolution across three quite 
distinct and progressive phases of transfer of legislative powers.38 In the first phase, under 
the Government of Wales Act 1998, devolution of environmental law-making to Wales was 
28 Scotland Act 1998, ss. 28–30, 38 (as amended). Reserved matters are list in Sch. 5 and include areas 
that have environmental implications such as energy, transport, and fishing outside national waters.
29 e.g. Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004.
30 e.g. Environmental Assessment (Scotland) Act 2005, s. 4(4) which covers the assessment of ‘Strategies’ 
as well the Plans and Programmes required under the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive.
31 e.g. the Water Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003 introduced river basin man-
agement planning in the UK.
32 e.g. Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 setting a stretching interim target for CO
2
 reduction of 
42 per cent as against the target of 34 per cent for the UK as a whole.
33 Northern Ireland Act 1998, ss. 5–7. Exceptions are found in Sch. 2 and matters reserved to the UK 
Parliament in Sch. 3.
34 Under the ‘Good Friday Agreement’.
35 Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006, the Water and Sewerage Services (Amendment) 
Act (Northern Ireland) 2010, and the Wildlife and Natural Environment Act (Northern Ireland) 2011.
36 There have been many long-standing criticisms of governance arrangements including significant 
overlaps in responsibility for environmental matters and the failure to separate environmental regulators 
from government departments with primary responsibility for environmental policy, see further, 
S. Turner, ‘Laying the Foundations for a Sustainable Northern Ireland: The Review of Environmental 
Governance’ (2008) 58(4) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 423.
37 It is notable that over ten years after a comprehensive review of environmental governance in 
Northern Ireland, no progress had been made on the central recommendation to create an independent 
Environmental Protection Agency, see S. Turner, ‘Laying the Foundations for a Sustainable Northern 
Ireland: The Review of Environmental Governance’ (2007) 58(7) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 422.
38 P. Bishop and M. Stallworthy (eds.), Environmental Law and Policy in Wales: Responding to Local 
and Global Challenges (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2013).
0004260729.INDD   357 12/18/2018   9:15:49 PM
Dictionary: NOSD
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/12/18, SPi
358   stuart bell
initially limited to secondary legislation and therefore the historical links to UK (and English) 
primary legislation were retained.39 Enhanced legislative powers were granted in 2006,40 but 
unrestricted primary law-making powers were finally granted in 2011.41
In pursuing a policy of prioritizing a broad conception of sustainable development, there 
have been significant administrative restructuring and legislative initiatives in Wales that 
promote an overarching philosophy of sustainable development and the integration of 
 environmental protection across a range of different policy areas.42 In particular, since 2015, 
and although relatively late in terms of full legislative competence, Wales has arguably done 
more than other UK countries in seeking to establish a distinctive identity in terms of 
 environmental law and policy.43
Whilst it is certainly arguable that the process of devolution has accelerated the fragmen-
tation of environmental law and policy within the four constituent countries, nevertheless, 
there is still a value and purpose in analysing the United Kingdom’s model of environmental 
law. Any fragmentation of law-making powers is still constrained to a certain extent by 
 several key factors. All foreign policy issues, including negotiation of environmental obli-
gations from international agreements or most critically from membership of the EU are 
non-devolved. Thus, the common core running through all legislation across the devolved 
countries in the UK comes from obligations under European environmental law. Even with 
a UK outside the EU, it is likely that there will be advantages in seeking to maintain a stable 
and harmonized core of UK environmental law to avoid imbalances that might have distorting 
effects for those who are regulated and detrimental environmental impacts.44
17.3 Structure and Substance  
of Environmental Law
‘UK environmental law’ is used here as a convenient ‘catch-all’ phrase that collates a core of 
statutes, regulations, formal and informal policies, and guidance dealing with pollution 
control and waste management, environmental quality standards, nature conservation, and 
39 Government of Wales Act 1998, s. 22 and more generally, V. Jenkins, ‘Environmental Law in Wales’ 
(2005) 17(2) Journal of Environmental Law 207.
40 Government of Wales Act 2006, Sch. 7.
41 Whilst further amendments to the scope and extent of legislative competence have been added under 
the Wales Act 2014 and Wales Act 2017—the latter of which established Wales’ legislative competency on the 
same footing as Scotland (i.e. moved from being a conferred matters model to a reserved matters model).
42 e.g. the formation of the main environmental regulator in Wales, Natural Resources Wales, inte-
grated the main pollution control agency (Environment Agency, Wales), nature conservation body 
(Countryside Council for Wales), and the Forestry Commission.
43 Well-Being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015, Environment (Wales) Act 2016, and the 
Planning (Wales) Act 2015, which meet the obligation to ‘make appropriate arrangements to promote 
sustainable development’, see Government of Wales Act 2006, s. 79(1) and H. Davies, ‘The Well-Being of 
Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015—A Step Change in the Legal Protection of the Interests of Future 
Generations?’ (2017) Journal of Environmental Law 165.
44 e.g. following the devolution of powers to raise taxes on the landfill of waste to Scotland, similar rates 
of taxation have been maintained in order to avoid incentives to import/export waste around the UK.
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land use planning. The focus here is on this core but with a recognition that the boundaries 
of this core are somewhat arbitrarily drawn. Thus, this coverage is subject to several general 
qualifications. First the limited coverage excludes many relevant areas of substantive law 
and policy outside this self-defined core.45 Second, the laws covered tend to emphasize 
 traditional top-down, command and control regulation at the expense of more integrative 
forms of environmental law and policy that emphasize governance and shared responsibility. 
Third, devolution of law-making powers means that any summary of the structure and 
substance of ‘UK’ environmental law cannot capture the breadth of variation in law and 
policy across the individual countries. Therefore, unless specified, the focus in this section 
is on the law in England but with a reminder that the laws in the other countries of the UK 
may vary, but not significantly.
17.3.1 Industrial Pollution Control
Industrial pollution control in the UK is regulated under an integrated system that attempts 
to streamline a wide range of substantive obligations into a single permitting procedure for 
prescribed industrial installations and waste management activities.
The Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 201646 provide an umbrella 
framework for pollution control permits that standardizes procedural requirements and 
impose a general duty on regulators to ‘exercise . . . relevant functions so as to achieve com-
pliance with’ a range of European Directives including the Industrial Emissions (IPPC) 
Directive and miscellaneous Directives on waste management and environmental quality.47
Primary responsibility for larger scale (and riskier) operations rests with the Environment 
Agency with local authorities playing a residual role for smaller scale activities.48 Where the 
IED (IPPC) Directive is engaged, permit conditions must be set by reference to the ‘Best 
Available Techniques’ which link to European-wide reference documents that set emissions 
limit value (ELV) standards for classes of installations.49 There is provision for standard-
ized permits with a single requirement to comply with a set of pre-agreed conditions for 
non-complex operations.50 Operating an industrial installation covered by the Regulations 
without a permit or in contravention of the conditions of a permit is a criminal offence.51
17.3.2 Air Quality and Climate Change
Legal and policy measures on air quality are complex and diverse featuring a mixture of 
industrial emissions controls,52 product standards for motor vehicles,53 and local initiatives 
45 Including areas such legislation dealing with historically contaminated land, noise, chemicals regu-
lation, agriculture, energy including renewables, transport, and animal welfare.
46 Made under the Pollution Prevention and Control Act 1999, ss. 2, 7(9), and Sch. 1.
47 See Sch. 7–22 where this phrase is used in conjunction with separately identified Directives.
48 Regulation 32.   49 See http://eippcb.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reference/.
50 Regulations 26–7.   51 Regulation 38.
52 Under the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2016.
53 See EC Regulation No. 443/2009.
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intended to address pollution hotspots.54 The central framework for policy can be found in 
the UK’s National Air Quality Strategy introduced under the Environment Act 1995 and given 
legal force under the Air Quality Regulations 2010.55 The Regulations set out alert thresholds 
and target values for pollutants in the Directive on ambient air quality and Cleaner Air for 
Europe (known as the CAFE Directive).56 The Regulations impose a strict legal duty on the 
Secretary of State to ‘ensure’ that the EU limit values are not exceeded.57 In practice, however, 
the obligation to secure compliance with this duty is delegated to the Environment Agency 
and local authorities using general pollution control powers and local powers to manage air 
quality.58 The gap between a centralized, strict legal duty to ensure that the targets are met 
and the delegation of local responsibility for meeting those targets has proved to be prob-
lematic. The inadequacy of the air quality plans and the lack of progress in meeting the 
obligations under the CAFE Directive were the subject of a successful challenge before the 
Supreme Court and CJEU which affirmed that the failure of the UK Government to take all 
necessary measures to secure compliance with the targets was in breach of the requirements 
of the Directive.59
The UK has taken an innovative approach in embedding the national climate change 
targets within primary legislation. The Climate Change Act 2008 fixes medium- and long-term 
emissions reduction targets and makes provision for five-yearly carbon budgets that are 
scheduled to run until 2032.60 These budgets provide a focal point for integrated action 
across different policy areas including renewable energy, transport, energy efficiency, and 
the reform of the energy markets. The Act also established the independent Committee on 
Climate Change which is responsible for monitoring progress towards the targets in  addition 
to providing independent advice on carbon budgets.61 Whilst this was a bold initiative that 
reflected a very specific commitment to action, there are differing views over the extent to 
which the targets are binding over future governments, or just what remedies would be 
available should the targets not be met.62 Whilst the Climate Change Act sets out the targets 
to be achieved, the operative measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases utilize a 
range of approaches. These include market-based mechanisms under the EU emissions 
trading scheme and economic instruments such as a tax on non-domestic users of energy 
to incentivize energy–efficiency measures.63 This tax is blended with self-regulatory measures 
in the form of climate change agreements with various industrial sectors featuring high 
energy users agreeing to reduce energy use and carbon dioxide emissions in exchange for a 
54 e.g. a congestion charging scheme in London introduced under the Greater London Authority Act 
1999, s. 295.
55 Environment Act, s. 80.
56 Directive 2008/50/EC on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe; Air Quality Regulations 
2010, Schs. 2–5.
57 Ibid., Part 3.   58 Environment Act 1995, Part IV.
59 Case C-404/13, R(ClientEarth) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(ECLI:EU:C:2014:2382); and R(ClientEarth) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
[2015] UKSC 28.
60 Climate Change Act 2008, Part 1, ss. 1–10.   61 Ibid., Part 2.
62 See C. Reid, ‘A New Sort of Duty? The Significance of ‘Outcome Duties’ in the Climate Change and 
Child Poverty Acts’ (2012) Public Law 749; McHarg, ‘Climate Change Constitutionalism?’.
63 The UK Climate Change Levy introduced under the Finance Act 2000, s. 30.
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discount on a Climate Change Levy applied to energy bills.64 Emissions from transport are 
addressed through specification standards and differential taxation for new vehicles and 
different types of fuel.65
17.3.3 Water Quality
Water quality in the UK is managed under the broad umbrella of meeting obligations under 
European legislation—notably the EU Water Framework Directive.66 There is no overarching 
strategic planning document. Individual emissions standards are used for certain ‘danger-
ous substances’ but in general, environmental quality standards have been adopted based 
upon the use of the receiving waters.67 Overall responsibility for achieving these standards 
lies with the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, although certain 
duties are delegated to the Environment Agency. In practice the operational responsibilities 
for maintaining water quality and pollution control rest with the Agency. The Agency is 
obliged to consider water quality standards when setting conditions in  environmental per-
mits and to monitor and vary such conditions as appropriate.68
The Permitting Regulations prohibit ‘causing or knowingly permitting any water dis-
charge activities’ unless such activities are authorized by an environmental permit.69 A ‘water 
discharge activity’ includes the discharge of ‘poisonous, noxious or polluting matter’, waste 
matter, or trade or sewage effluent into inland freshwaters, coastal or territorial waters.70
Under previous legislation the concept of ‘polluting matter’ has been construed broadly.71 
The concepts of causation and knowingly permitting have been explored extensively in the 
case-law under previous legislation, being interpreted in an increasingly purposive and 
broad fashion.72 This has resulted in criminal liability being established with only minimal 
causal connections between an activity and any resulting entry into controlled waters.73 The 
potential impacts of such a broad, purposive interpretation of criminal liability are some-
what mitigated through a selective approach to enforcement.74 A wide range of remedial 
and civil sanctions that impose clean-up requirements or seek to recover the costs of clean 
up following pollution incidents supplements criminal sanctions.75
64 i.e. voluntary agreements made by UK industrial sectors to reduce emissions over two-year periods 
in return for discounts on the Climate Change Levy, see http://www.gov.uk/guidance/ climate-change-
agreements.
65 Under EC Regulation No. 443/2009.   66 Directive 2000/60/EC.
67 e.g. for drinking water see the Water Supply (Water Quality) Regulations 2016.
68 Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2016, Sch. 21.
69 Regulation 12(1)(b).   70 Schedule 21, para. 3(1).
71 NRA v Biffa Waste Services [1996] Env LR 227; R v Dovermoss [1995] Environmental Law Reports 258.
72 Empress Car Company (Abertillery) Ltd v NRA [1998] Environmental Law Reports LR 396.
73 Express Ltd (t/a Express Dairies Distribution) v Environment Agency [2003] Environmental Law 
Reports 29.
74 Although for major industrial operators the position has changed dramatically with the adoption of 
more stringent sentencing guidelines, see section 17.4.5 and R v Thames Water Utilities [2015] Environmental 
Law Reports 36.
75 Water Resources Act, s. 161 and the civil sanctions regime under the Regulatory Enforcement and 
Sanctions Act 2008 (below).
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Pollution from aggregated non-point emissions sources such as from agricultural  activities, 
transport, and urban run-off are not subject to the permitting requirements. The most serious 
water quality issues from diffuse sources in the UK come from high levels of nutrients and 
pesticides from agricultural operations. The UK has mainly adopted a zoning approach in 
relation to nitrate pollution from agricultural sources.76 Unlike waste management and air 
pollution where market-based mechanisms have been increasingly adopted, economic 
instruments have not been used to any great degree.77
17.3.4 Waste Management
Waste management regulation in the UK has historically concentrated on the regulation of 
the final disposal of waste in large landfill sites. Over recent years, much greater effort has 
been put into a broader, mixed regulation approach. This is largely a result of European law 
but dwindling capacity in landfill has also been an influential factor. These initiatives appear 
to have been successful with a marked decline in waste production and landfill and a significant 
rise in recycling rates. However, the increase in the export of waste to non-EU countries 
suggests that displacement activities have also played a role.78
The overarching aims of waste management policy can be found in the national waste 
plans for the devolved countries of the UK.79 These plans provide high-level policy guidance 
and have no legally binding effects but do help structure discretionary decision-making at 
a national and local level.
The central definition of ‘waste’ in UK law has been the subject of extensive litigation in 
the national and European courts. This litigation generally reflects the uncertainties created 
by underlying policy and regulatory tensions.80 The definition of waste involves a seemingly 
simple question as to whether a particular item has been ‘discarded’.81 Whilst this covers 
consignment to a waste management activity, namely disposal, recycling, and recovery, it 
has not always been straightforward to distinguish between the subjective and objective 
view of whether an item has been discarded. The courts have tended to construe the 
 definition broadly in adopting a precautionary and restrictive approach but limited any 
individual decision to the specific facts of any case.82 Thus, there is yet to be a definitive test 
76 Originally under the Water Resources Act 1991, s. 94 and then subsequently under the Nitrate 
Pollution Prevention Regulations 2015.
77 Contrast this with ongoing developments in other European countries. See T. Bocker and R. Finer, 
‘European Pesticide Tax Schemes in Comparison: An analysis of Experiences and Developments’ (2016) 
8 Sustainability 378; C. Rougoor et al., ‘Experiences with Fertilizer Taxes in Europe’ (2010) 44 Journal of 
Environmental Planning and Management 877.
78 European statistics show that the export of all notified waste from the UK rose from 36,000 tonnes 
in 2001 to nearly 4.2 million tonnes in 2014, see http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.
php/Waste_shipment_statistics.
79 See the National Waste Management Plan for England available at: http://www.gov.uk/defra.
80 E.  Scotford, ‘Trash or Treasure: Policy Tensions in EC Waste Regulation’ (2007) 19 Journal of 
Environmental Law 367.
81 Article 3(1) Directive 2008/98/EC.   82 R v W [2013] Environmental Law Reports 15.
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or set of principles laid down and the case law is ‘uncertain, contradictory, vague and very 
difficult to apply’.83
Waste operations including the recovery or disposal of waste fall within the general 
requirement for an environmental permit under the Environmental Permitting (England 
and Wales) Regulations 2016.84 The Environment Agency has overall responsibility for 
determining applications and for monitoring and reviewing permitted activities. The 
Agency has wide enforcement powers to vary, suspend, or revoke permits.85 Carrying out 
waste activities without a permit or in non-compliance with permit conditions is a criminal 
offence.86 In keeping with a compliance-focused enforcement policy, criminal enforcement 
is seen very much as a last resort.87
Control over any party in the waste chain (including individuals) is applied through a 
more general ‘duty of care’ underpinned by a statutory Code of Practice.88 The duty requires 
every party in the waste chain to take reasonable steps to ensure the safe management of 
waste from production to final disposal. Breach of the duty is a criminal offence.89
17.3.5 Nature Conservation and Landscape Protection
In very general terms, there is a dual approach to nature conservation in the UK with laws 
that seek to designate key protected sites alongside provisions that prohibit any direct and 
indirect interference with protected species of individual animals and plants. The designation 
of nationally and internationally important sites relies heavily on an approach using admin-
istrative and financial mechanisms that emphasize the importance of active management of 
protected habitats.90 Species protection relies on extensive prohibitions under the criminal 
law, subject to certain exemptions via licensing systems.91
Nature conservation law and policy is administered by specialist agencies in each country 
of the United Kingdom.92 These agencies have responsibility for identifying and notifying 
protected sites and species and have powers to enforce the law, through criminal prosecution 
where relevant.
The main statutory provisions relating to both species and habitats protection can be 
found in the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, an Act that has been updated through various 
amendments and supplementary secondary legislation—particularly to accommodate changes 
in European law.93 These changes, along with a range of international and other designations, 
83 E. Lees, Interpreting Environmental Offences. The Need for Certainty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) 
76; judicial comment in R(OSS Group Ltd) v Environment Agency [2007] Environmental Law Reports 8.
84 Regulations 2(1) and 12(1).   85 Regulations 36–7.   86 Regulation 38(1).
87 There were fifty-four waste prosecutions brought by the Agency in 2015, see Environment Agency, 
‘Regulating the Waste Industry: 2015 evidence summary’, available at: http://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/regulating-the-waste-industry-2015-evidence-summary.
88 Environmental Protection Act 1990, s. 34 and Waste Duty of Care: Code of Practice, available at: 
http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/waste-duty-of-care-code-of-practice.
89 Environmental Protection Act 1990, s. 34(6).
90 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, Part II.   91 Ibid., Part I.
92 Natural England, Natural Resources Wales, Scottish Natural Heritage, and the Northern Ireland 
Environment Agency.
93 e.g. under the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 and Natural Environment and Rural 
Communities Act 2006.
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have created a patchwork of protected sites and landscape areas under national and European 
law with complex, often overlapping systems of regulation.94
The two most significant national designations are the National Nature Reserve (NNR) 
and the Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI), with the former largely being managed by 
the nature conservation agencies (e.g. Natural England) and the latter being within private 
ownership with certain limits on operations and activities that may be undertaken on the 
land.95 These designations overlap with international and European designations including 
Special Protection Areas and Special Areas of Conservation.96 They are selected on scien-
tific grounds using criteria determined by the Joint Nature Conservation Committee 
(JNCC) which is the main statutory advisor to the UK government and devolved adminis-
trations.97 European sites have overarching legislative objectives in terms of maintaining or 
restoring important habitat types and habitats of species to a favourable status. This requires 
stability of a species’ or habitat’s range over the long term.98 These objectives are considered 
in the context of the assessment of any potential operations or development that might 
impact on European sites.
The distinction between national sites and European sites is also material when considering 
procedures for consenting activities and/or development on such sites. For national sites, 
owners and occupiers must apply for consent before undertaking any operations listed in 
the original notification of designation. Where consent is refused, the operations cannot go 
ahead.99 For European sites, there is a more complicated process requiring an ‘appropriate 
assessment’ of the impact on the conservation objectives from a proposed plan or project 
including any proposed mitigation or compensation measures.100 In this context the term 
‘plan or project’ includes broader strategic plans as well as individual development proposals 
that could impact on the integrity of a European site.101
17.4 Implementation Framework
It will come as no surprise that the structure of the administration of environmental law in 
the UK is complex and lacks general coherence. Responsibilities for environmental matters 
are spread widely across a diverse range of administrative bodies. Moreover, devolution has 
added further parallel layers of administration with increasingly distinctive and sophisticated 
governance arrangements at the national level in the countries of a devolved United Kingdom.102 
As a consequence it is difficult to identify an underlying rationale for how and why the current 
94 The statutory advisor to the UK Government, the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC) 
list over thirty designations at http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/page-1527.
95 This focus on managerial responsibility is the key distinction between these two designation 
because in practice all NNRs are designated as SSSIs.
96 Under the Directive 2009/147/EC (Wild Birds) and Directive 92/43/EEC (Habitats) respectively.
97 Available at http://jncc.defra.gov.uk.   98 Ibid.
99 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, s. 28E(3).
100 Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2010, reg. 61.
101 See Case C-6/04 Commission v United Kingdom [2005] ECR I-9017.
102 e.g. whilst the national environmental enforcement agencies in England, Wales, and Scotland have 
common areas of responsibility (e.g. in relation to pollution control functions) they also differ significantly 
in terms of the breadth of areas covered and individual governance arrangements.
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structural arrangements have emerged, other than as pragmatic and incremental response 
to different political priorities at different stages in the evolution of  environmental law.
17.4.1 Central Government
In central government responsibility for environmental law, policy, and decision-making 
has always been spread across different departments.103 At the time of writing, responsi-
bility for the core of environmental law and policy in the Westminster Parliament is led 
by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). Other environmen-
tal responsibilities are divided amongst a range of departments including the Department 
for Communities and Local Government (DCLG);104 the Department of Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy;105 the Department of Transport; the Treasury;106 and the Ministry 
of Justice.107
The diffusion of policy across different departments raises the challenge of coordinated 
responses to environmental problems. In 1970, the creation of an integrated Department of 
the Environment108 was driven by a desire to achieve ‘better policy coordination through 
the departmental integration of closely related functional responsibilities’.109 A pattern of 
‘tinkering’ with different policy areas in a cycle of integration and separation has followed 
since that time depending upon different elected governments’ views of the priority of 
 environmental protection. This ‘tinkering’ with central responsibilities can have a symbolic 
significance. An example of this symbolism can be seen in the evolution of responsibility for 
climate change within UK central government. In 2008, the creation of the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) through the merger of the relevant sections of the 
environment and business departments was widely seen as a symbol of the prioritization of 
two key policy areas. Eight years later and following extended criticism of whether a 
 separate department was efficient or necessary,110 DECC was unceremoniously abolished 
and climate change policy now sits within the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy. Whether this represents a reduction of the national commitment to being a global 
leader on climate change or further integration within a large, more influential government 
department is debatable.
103 e.g. pollution control responsibilities for the Alkali Act and successors were moved between the 
Board of Trade, the Local Government Board, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government, and finally the Department of the Environment on its creation in 1970.
104 With responsibility for town and country planning.
105 Energy and climate change.
106 Environmental taxation such as the Landfill Tax and Climate Change Levy.
107 Access to justice matters.
108 Claimed to be the ‘World’s first such Governmental department’ see D.  Russel and A.  Jordan, 
‘Environmental Policy Integration in the UK’ in A.  Goria, A.  Sgobbi, and I.  von Homeyer (eds.), 
Governance for the Environment: A Comparative Analysis of Environmental Policy Integration 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010), 158.
109 M. Painter, ‘Policy Co-ordination in the Department of the Environment, 1970–1976’ (1980) 58(2) 
Public Administration 135.
110 Evidence of this can be seen in an unsuccessful Private Members Bill to abolish DECC, see the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (Abolition) Bill 2015–16.
0004260729.INDD   365 12/18/2018   9:15:49 PM
Dictionary: NOSD
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 18/12/18, SPi
366   stuart bell
Central control is normally exercised by government departments through a  combination 
of new legislation, policy variation, and individual decision-making. Environmental laws 
are often framed in such a way as to provide for wide powers to be delegated to the Secretary 
of State to exercise legislative or quasi-legislative functions. For example, the Secretary of 
State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has general powers to issue ‘directions of 
a specific or general character’ to the Environment Agency in exercising any of its func-
tions.111 Although laws provide the framework for power, they have little to say about how 
such powers should be exercised. Hence, the role of policy is paramount here. The practical 
application of policy is seen through a centralized power to determine appeals against 
 certain decisions.112
Accountability for the effectiveness of environmental law and policy is maintained 
through scrutiny by several cross-party Parliamentary Select Committees and the House of 
Commons Environmental Audit Committee.113 These Committees undertake regular 
inquiries into different environmental policy areas. In doing do they invite evidence from 
external witnesses (including academics, practitioners, and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs)) as part of a process of scrutinizing the effectiveness of law, policy, and  practical 
implementation. The recommendations of these Select Committees are influential when 
the government is considering changes to law and policy.
17.4.2 Local Government
In keeping with a long history of devolving certain decisions to the local level, several 
operational aspects of environmental law and policy are decentralized to local authorities. 
The most significant of these is the role of the local planning authority with responsibility 
for strategic plan-making and individual development control decisions. Local authorities 
also have responsibilities for other environmental functions such as air quality management, 
waste collection and recycling, statutory nuisances, and identifying and cleaning up con-
taminated sites.
17.4.3 Specialist Agencies
In keeping with a fragmented approach to environmental regulation, specialist public agencies 
are generally divided functionally and geographically in each of the constituent countries of 
the UK.114 In England and Scotland there are two main regulators dealing with pollution 
control, namely the Environment Agency (EA) and the Scottish Environment Protection 
111 Environment Act 1995, s. 40.
112 In the planning system, appeals are heard by the Planning Inspectorate on behalf of the Secretary 




114 A broad description fails to capture the degree to which there are exceptions and anomalies. e.g. 
the Drinking Water Inspectorate has responsibility for drinking water quality in England and Wales and 
private water companies have regulatory responsibility for trade effluent discharges to sewers.
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Agency respectively. Nature conservation functions are undertaken by Natural England 
and Scottish Natural Heritage. Wales (Natural Resources Wales) and Northern Ireland 
(Northern Ireland Environment Agency) have a single integrated regulator with overall 
responsibility for both pollution control and nature conservation along with other associated 
activities (e.g. marine licensing and fisheries). The major distinction here is that NRW is an 
independent public body whilst NIEA is an executive agency within the Department of 
Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs.115
This diversity of responsibilities reflects the influence of history and the fragmenting 
effect of devolution. For example, in England, the EA and Natural England represent the 
latest iterations of a long sequence of mergers of smaller, more specialized agencies with 
different areas of responsibilities and cultures. The EA has overall responsibility for a wide 
range of functions including pollution control regulation, water resources, flood management, 
and fisheries and is subject to a wide range of duties, aims, and objectives, with the principal 
aim of ‘attaining the objective of achieving sustainable development’.116 Perhaps as a conse-
quence of the breadth of functions of the Agency and the diffuse nature of these aims and 
objectives, it suffers from the criticism that it lacks a distinctive regulatory  identity.117 In 
other words it is often difficult to differentiate between the EA’s role in policing compliance 
from its role in advising polluters or its role as a potential champion of the unowned envir-
onment. Although the Agency is independent of government it does not pursue a distinctively 
individual or aggressive policy agenda.
17.4.4 The Role of Courts and Tribunals
Courts and tribunals fulfil a number of different but complementary roles in adjudicat-
ing environmental disputes in the UK. The usual caveat applies here, namely that in a 
multi-jurisdictional United Kingdom there are structural differences in the court systems. 
Starting at the lowest level, there are specialist administrative tribunals that determine deci-
sions on miscellaneous land use planning and environmental appeals. These decisions are 
heavily influenced by the application of central and local policies. Moreover although such 
decisions can involve the consideration and application of legal principles, they carry no legal 
significance and are subject to review in a specialist Chamber of the civil High Court.118 In 
comparison to civil law countries, therefore, the lack of a specialized administrative court 
system is notable. At the next level, powers to determine criminal liability and sentencing 
for offences under environmental law rest mainly with the Magistrates’ Court and the Crown 
115 Leading to criticisms about legitimacy and accountability, see Turner, ‘Laying the Foundations for 
a Sustainable Northern Ireland’.
116 Environment Act 1995, s. 4(1); other duties and objectives can be found in ss. 5–9.
117 D. Bell and T. Gray, ‘The Ambiguous Role of the Environment Agency in England and Wales’ 
(2002) 11(3) Environmental Politics 76.
118 The Planning Inspectorate decides a wide range of environmental appeals including appeals 
against refusals of planning permission under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990; under the 
Environmental Permitting Regulations 2016; under the Environmental Damage (Prevention and 
Remediation) England Regulations 2015; and against refusals of Hazardous Substances consent under 
the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990.
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Court.119 Civil courts also determine private law claims with environmental dimensions 
(e.g. nuisance) and fulfil an appellate function for statutory rights of appeal.120
In terms of their influence on environmental jurisprudence, however, these courts play a 
subsidiary role when compared to the High Court’s jurisdiction over the judicial review of 
administrative powers and duties found in environmental legislation.121 The role of the 
courts in this context tends to be supervisory and not necessarily adjudicatory of the sub-
stantive merits of decisions. There is deference to technical fact-finding and the  interpretation 
and application of policy when exercising administrative discretion by specialist regulators.122 
There is also an emphasis on due process and general administrative  principles of substan-
tive illegality as opposed to say the ‘correct’ application of environmental  principles or of 
any notions of environmental justice in its own right.
17.4.4.1 Access to Justice
The term ‘access to justice’ in the context of environmental matters in the UK is generally 
used when considering the adequacy and availability of public law remedies for private 
individuals and representative groups (e.g. NGOs). Unlike other European countries, there 
is no significant link between individuals or representative groups and the enforcement of 
civil or criminal environmental law.123 The extent to which courts and judicial review play a 
sufficient or normative role in UK environmental law has been the subject of lengthy debate.124 
In that debate, two main themes dominate. The first is procedural, namely whether judicial 
review provides adequate access to justice for claimants challenging environmental 
decisions. This involves questions of the adequacy of the implementation of obligations 
under the Aarhus Convention and European law and the extent to which there are 
 procedural hurdles to bringing environmental claims.125 In the UK the most significant of 
these hurdles are whether a claimant has a ‘sufficient interest’ to bring a claim; whether the 
time limits for bringing a claim are unduly restrictive; and whether the procedural rules on 
paying the costs of litigation are unduly punitive for individual parties. The second theme 
is institutional and structural, namely the extent to which any inherent limitations of the 
119 With the severity of the offence and level of available sanctions determining which layer considers 
which offences.
120 e.g. appeals against abatement notices can be heard at the Magistrates Court under the statutory 
nuisance provisions in Part II of the Environmental Protection Act 1990, s. 79.
121 This includes both general powers of judicial review and statutory rights of appeal against deci-
sions on questions of law e.g. Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s. 288 provides for challenges against 
planning decisions.
122 e.g. in relation to nature conservation site designation see R (Western Power Distribution 
Investments Ltd) v Countryside Council for Wales [2007] Environmental Law Reports 25; Fisher v English 
Nature [2005] Environmental Law Reports 10.
123 N.  Sadeleer, G.  Roller, and M.  Dross, Access to Justice in Environmental Matters ENV.A.3/
ETU/2002/0030 11.
124 P. McAuslan, ‘The Role of Courts and other Judicial Type Bodies in Environmental Management’ 
(1991) 3(2) Journal of Environmental Law 195; H.  Woolf, ‘Are the Judiciary Environmentally Myopic’ 
(1992) 4(1) Journal of Environmental Law 1.
125 UN/ECE Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access 
to justice in environmental matters (Aarhus Convention). The EU position is complex with no general 
Directive on access to justice (see COM/2003/0624) but individual provisions in specific Directives e.g. Art. 
25 Directive 2010/75/EU on Industrial Emissions (IPPC).
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current role of the courts could be addressed through the introduction of a specialist 
 environmental court.
17.4.4.2 The Requirement of a ‘Sufficient Interest’
In the UK there is a relatively liberal approach taken in relation to who can bring an 
 environmental judicial review claim.126 In general a claimant must demonstrate that they 
have a ‘sufficient interest’ in the subject of the proceedings.127 Historically, this concept was 
narrowly construed.128 This meant that representative challenges to decisions affecting the 
unowned environment by NGOs or individuals would not necessarily meet the require-
ment of ‘sufficient interest’.129 In a series of decisions liberalizing this requirement in public 
interest litigation, the courts shifted away from a rights-focused to an interests-focused 
approach. It was recognized that representative challenges to environmental decisions 
invariably involved breaches of public law and the importance of the public interest in such 
decisions meant that any individual member of the representative group would have a 
‘sufficient interest’ regardless of whether any private right existed.130
17.4.4.3 Time Limits
The second barrier to access to justice in the UK is the requirement to bring a claim for 
judicial review within certain time limits and in some cases to do so ‘promptly’ even within 
the specified time limit.131 The specific time limit for general environmental judicial review 
claims is three months from the date on which the grounds for bringing the claim first 
arose.132 In challenges to planning decisions there is a strict six-week time limit.133 The 
requirement for claimants to act ‘promptly’ even within the general three month time limit 
was criticized as being vague and uncertain by the Aarhus Convention’s Compliance 
Committee.134 Subsequently, it was found to be in contravention of the legal principles of 
certainty and effectiveness by the European Court with a corresponding interpretation 
126 There was a period when the rules on standing were interpreted in an ‘unduly restrictive’ fashion 
in Scotland but the Supreme Court took the opportunity to regularize the position in AXA General 
Insurance v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, applied in the context of an environmental case in Walton v 
Scottish Ministers [2013] Environmental Law Reports 16 and then incorporated into formal procedure 
under the Court of Session Act 1988, s. 27B(2).
127 Senior Courts Act 1981, s. 31(3), Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978, s. 18(4), and Court of 
Session Act 1988, s. 27B(2)(a).
128 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Rose Theatre Trust [1990] 1 QB 504 in which a 
newly formed group sought to protect a Shakespearean theatre.
129 C. Hilson and I. Cram, ‘Judicial Review and Environmental Law—Is There a Coherent View of 
Standing?’ (1996) Legal Studies 1.
130 These decisions have the effect of excluding only a ‘mere busybody interfering in something with 
which (s)he has no legitimate concern’: Walton v Scottish Ministers.
131 Senior Courts Act 1981, s. 31(6) and the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), r. 54.5.
132 R v Hammersmith London Borough Council, ex parte Burkett [2003] Environmental Law Reports 6, 
in which the House of Lords held that in planning cases, the trigger date was the grant of the permission 
that was the subject of the challenge.
133 This is the case under both the statutory appeal route and where a planning permission is challenged 
by way of general judicial review: CPR 54.5(5) and Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s. 288(3).
134 Communication ACCC/C2008/33, available at: http://unece.org/env/pp/compliance/ 
Compliancecommittee/ 33TableUK.html.
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latterly in domestic cases.135 This has the effect of ensuring that in cases involving European 
law, there is no requirement to act ‘promptly’ although there remains a residual requirement 
for ‘promptness’ for those aspects of a case that feature national rather than European law.136
17.4.4.4 Costs and Funding
The third and potentially the most significant barrier to access to justice in the UK is the 
extent to which the cost of public interest litigation in environmental matters complies with 
the requirement of the Aarhus Convention that access to justice should not be ‘prohibitively 
expensive’.137 The general presumption in the UK is that the loser in any civil or administrative 
action will pay both their own and the winner’s costs unless there is a specific  procedural 
rule or order by the judge that rebuts that presumption. Litigation is expensive and in true 
public interest cases, the risk of a liability for costs acts as a significant disincentive to potential 
claimants.138
The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 introduced amendments that impose a pre-
sumptive costs limit of £5,000 per individual claimant or £10,000 for groups or companies 
in ‘Aarhus Convention Claims’.139 These fixed limits are not automatically applied to every 
Aarhus claim. There is power in the Rules to vary the limit on the costs if it would comply 
with the requirement to not make the proceedings ‘prohibitively expensive’.140
These rules go some way towards implementing the Aarhus requirements and European 
law on costs in environmental cases. These changes were introduced after criticisms by the 
European Court that the previous rules were not ‘sufficiently precise and clear enough’ to 
ensure that proceedings were not ‘prohibitively expensive’.141 Arguably, the rules are still not 
fully Aarhus compliant as statutory planning appeals are not covered by either the fixed 
costs rules or the new ability for a court to make Costs Capping Orders in general judicial 
review claims (i.e. non Aarhus Convention Claims).142 This anomaly has been criticized by 
the Court of Appeal and the Aarhus Convention’s Compliance Committee,143 but as the 
Convention is not directly effective in the UK courts, the government appears to have a 
discretion over manner in which the obligations are implemented.
135 Case C-406/08 Uniplex (UK) Ltd v NHS Business Services Authority.
136 R (Buglife) v Medway Council [2011] Environmental Law Reports 27; also R (Berky) v Newport City 
Council [2012] Environmental Law Reports 35 in which the requirement for promptness applied to 
grounds of challenge brought in relation to alleged bias and irrationality.
137 Article 9 Aarhus Convention, that requires access to environmental justice procedures that are 
adequate and effective and not prohibitively expensive.
138 The same is also true in private interest cases where there is an overlapping public interest e.g. pri-
vate nuisances, although the financial incentive to bring such cases may be slightly different.
139 CPR, rr. 41–45 for ‘Aarhus Convention Claims’. A defendant’s costs in an Aarhus claim are limited 
to £35,000. There are slightly broader principles to limit costs in the case of statutory appeals to the High 
Court including claims brought against planning decisions under the Town and Country Planning Act 
1990, s. 288; see CPR, rr. 52.19 and 52.19A.
140 i.e. exceed the claimant’s financial resources or be objectively unreasonable taking into account the 
circumstances of the claim (e.g. prospect of success, complexity, and the importance of the issues).
141 Case C-530/11 European Commission v UK [2014] Environmental Law Reports D2.
142 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, ss. 88–90 and CPR, r. 46.17 in the case of general judicial review.
143 Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government v Venn [2015] Environmental Law 
Reports 14; UNECE, Decision V/9n on compliance by the UK.
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17.4.4.5 A Specialist Environmental Court
There has been a long history of calls for a specialist court in England to deal solely with 
 environmental matters.144 When a separate environmental court (of sorts) was finally created 
in 2010, the model adopted was hardly revolutionary. The Environment section of the General 
Regulatory Chamber of the First-Tier Tribunal was created originally to adjudicate on the 
civil sanctions regime.145 The type of claims heard in the tribunal are some way away from the 
original vision of a specialist environmental court as a ‘one-stop shop’. The volume of appeals 
has not been significant and an opportunity to transfer the high volume of planning cases to 
the Court was rejected on costs grounds.146 Certainly, as long as the remit of the tribunal 
remains narrow, it is unlikely to have any material impact on domestic  environmental law.
17.4.5 Enforcement
In keeping with its historical roots, the enforcement of UK environmental law remains 
firmly based on a discretionary, compliance model whereby regulatory agencies tend to 
seek to ‘engage with business to educate and enable compliance’ rather than sanctioning 
non-compliance in a rigid and legalistic fashion.147 Thus, in cases where there are ongoing 
relationships between a regulator and regulated parties, there will often be a cooperative 
approach to non-compliance where negotiation and persuasion are used in preference to 
more formal action.
The discretionary element of enforcing environmental law is emphasized by the availability 
of a wide range of civil (i.e. non-criminal) sanctions under the Regulatory Enforcement and 
Sanctions Act 2008.148 This legislation provides the Environment Agency149 with  flexible 
tools to deal with environmental offenders without having to bring a formal prosecution.
In contrast to this informal, flexible, negotiated style of compliance and the use of civil 
sanctions, the substance of environmental law makes widespread use of no fault or strict 
liability for criminal offences.150 This is in keeping with the approach to criminal liability for 
other regulatory offences which have traditionally not been viewed in the same context as 
traditional crimes.151 The potential unfairness of the strictness of criminal liability for 
144 P. McAuslan, ‘The Role of Courts and other Judicial Type Bodies in Environmental Management’ 
(1991) 3(2) Journal of Environmental Law 195; H.  Woolf, ‘Are the Judiciary Environmentally Myopic’ 
(1992) 4(1) Journal of Environmental Law 1.
145 Regulatory and Enforcement Sanctions Act 2008, Part III. The First-Tier Tribunal was created in the 
reorganization of the administrative tribunals system in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
146 Defra, Environmental Permitting—Consultation on Draft Environmental Permitting (England 
and Wales)(Amendment) Regulations 2013—a package of measures.
147 Environment Agency, ‘Enforcement and Sanctions Statement’ (2014) 4.
148 In England and Wales, the details are found in secondary legislation, see the Environmental Civil 
Sanctions (England) Order 2010 and the Environmental Civil Sanctions (Wales) Order 2010. The posi-
tion is slightly different in Scotland under the Regulatory Reform (Scotland) Act 2014, Part 3.
149 With SEPA and Natural Resources Wales having similar powers.
150 The Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts: A Consultation Paper, 
Consultation paper, No. 195, available at: http://www.%20lawcom.gov.uk/project/criminal-%20liability- 
%20in-%20regulatory-%20contexts/.
151 Ibid.
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 environmental offences is balanced out by the availability of civil sanctions, statutory 
defences that emphasize certain mitigating factors (e.g. due diligence to avoid the commission 
of an offence), and the scale of penalties that may be imposed by the courts to reflect the 
degree of blame or harm caused.152
Until relatively recently, the modest limits for fines in the lowest tier of the criminal 
courts (where many environmental offences are tried) combined with the moral ambiguity 
associated with the regulatory nature of environmental offences in the UK was reflected in 
relatively low sanctions, particularly fines for corporate offenders. Following sustained 
 criticisms of the lack of a sufficient sanctioning and deterrent effect, sentencing guidelines 
have been produced that provide for a process in which fines are set by reference to variable 
factors including the size and culpability of a corporate offender along with the significance 
of the environmental harm caused. The guidelines have been endorsed in the Court of 
Appeal. In particular, the Court noted that in serious cases involving ‘very large organisations’, 
it would not be unreasonable to punish with a fine of up to 100 per cent of that company’s 
annual pre-tax profit.153 The practical impact of these guidelines have been seen in one 
example from the water industry. From 2005–13, Thames Water was the most heavily fined 
water company in the UK with overall fines totalling £842,500 from eighty-seven pollution 
incidents.154 In 2017, it was fined for £20.3 million for a series of pollution incidents at sewage 
treatment works.155
17.5 Conclusion: Fragmentation 
and Integration? UK Environmental 
Law in Flux
The development of the UK model of environmental law is a story of incremental and 
pragmatic change. The current state of UK environmental law reflects a combination of 
 historical influences on regulatory culture, the dominance of the approximation of European 
law, and the emergence of distinctive national legal identities within the countries of the 
UK. This cycle of fragmentation and integration continues with the UK’s decision to leave 
the EU. The contingent nature of Brexit negotiations and the UK’s place within Europe but 
outside the EU leaves the question of possible future directions for UK environmental law 
very much open.
On a basic level, the reductionist thoroughness of ‘copy out’ and referential techniques to 
transpose Directives means that European law will continue to play an influential role in the 
UK for some time after leaving the EU. Many key concepts in UK environmental law have 
only previously been interpreted through a European lens. Simplistic revisionism cannot 
deny the evolution of many domestic environmental laws through the European law making 
process and subsequent interpretations by the European courts. In this sense, the questions 
152 Ibid.   153 R v Thames Water Utilities [2015] Environmental Law Reports 36.
154 ‘Revealed: how UK water companies are polluting Britain’s rivers and beaches’, the Guardian, 
3 August 2013.
155 ‘Thames Water hit with record £20m fine for huge sewage leaks’, the Guardian, 22 March 2017.
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about leaving the EU are not just about which laws still apply, they are also about how we 
make sense of domestic laws which have that in-built European context.
Moreover, membership of the EU has provided the stability for the UK to devolve 
 environmental law-making powers in a way which encourages distinctive national approaches 
within the UK whilst maintaining a degree of substantive coherence. The absence of the 
constraining effect of European obligations may encourage further fragmentation in the 
countries of the UK. Certainly, there is evidence of greater clarity in the distinctiveness of 
environmental governance in Scotland and Wales that suggests that regulatory style may 
diverge notwithstanding similar substantive laws. Whether this type of structural fragmen-
tation will help to address the issues of the complexity, incoherence, and lack of integration 
of environmental law in the UK as a single nation is quite a different matter.
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